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Abstract :: One of the newest research areas in moral philosophy is moral 
phenomenology: the dedicated study of the experiential dimension of moral mental 
life. The idea has been to bring phenomenological evidence to bear on some 
central issues in metaethics and moral psychology, such as cognitivism and 
noncognitivism about moral judgment, motivational internalism and externalism, 
and so on. However, moral phenomenology faces certain foundational challenges, 
pertaining especially to the existence, describability, and importance of its subject 
matter. This paper addresses these foundational challenges, arguing that moral 
experiences – in the phenomenal, what-is-like sense of the term – exist, are 
informatively describable, and are central for the concerns of moral philosophy at 
large.  
 
 
 
1. Introduction: Three Questions 
 
In summarizing J.L. Mackie’s (1977) argument for error theory, John McDowell 
writes: 
J.L. Mackie insists that ordinary evaluative thought presents itself as a matter of 
sensitivity to aspects of the world. And this phenomenological thesis seems correct. 
When one or another variety of philosophical non-cognitivism claims to capture the truth 
about what the experience of value is like, or (or in a familiar surrogate for 
phenomenology) about what we mean by our evaluative language, the claim is never 
based on careful attention to the lived character of evaluative thought… (McDowell 
1985: 110) 
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Jonathan Dancy sounds a similar note: 
[W]e take moral value to be part of the fabric of the world; taking our experience at face 
value, we judge it to be the experience of the moral properties of actions and agents in 
the world.  And if we are to work with the presumption that the world is the way our 
experience represents it to us as being, we should take it in the absence of contrary 
considerations that actions and agents do have the sorts of moral properties we 
experience in them.  This is an argument about the nature of moral experience, which 
moves from that nature to the probable nature of the world. (Dancy 1986: 172) 
Further developing the phenomenological argument for moral cognitivism, 
Michael Smith writes: 
… we are to argue that our concept of value is the concept of a property that is there to 
be experienced. The argument for this is to be phenomenological. We are to argue that 
evaluative experience presents itself to us as the experience of properties genuinely 
possessed by the objects that confront us. This phenomenological argument is to yield 
the conclusion that objects seem to have evaluative properties. (Smith 1993: 242) 
My purpose here is not to evaluate the phenomenological arguments presented 
by Mackie, McDowell, Dancy, and Smith. My interest is rather in the very notion 
of phenomenological appeal in moral theory.  
As the above quotations show, this kind of appeal has a venerable history 
in analytic moral philosophy. Yet it is only in the past decade or so that moral 
phenomenology has been explicitly treated (and pursued) as a self-standing 
area of research. To a first approximation, we may understand moral 
phenomenology as the dedicated study of the experiential dimension of moral 
mental life, where “experiential” in terms of phenomenal consciousness or what-
it-is-like-ness (Horgan and Tienson 2005, 2008a, Kriegel 2008). The idea has 
been to bring phenomenological evidence to bear on some central issues in 
metaethics and moral psychology, such as cognitivism and noncognitivism 
about moral judgment (Horgan and Timmons 2006, Kriegel 2012), 
sentimentalism and rationalism (Gill 2009, Horgan and Timmons forthcoming), 
error theory and the objectivistic purport of moral thought and discourse (Loeb 
2007, Horgan and Timmons 2008b), and so on.  
There are, however, three foundational challenges moral phenomenology 
must overcome before we can take it seriously. In this section, I present the gist 
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of these challenges. In the following ones, I adduce preliminary considerations 
intended to address them.  
The most basic challenge to moral phenomenology would be the claim 
that it has no subject matter. The claim can come in two grades. In its strong 
version, it would be that there are no moral experiences. In its weaker version, it 
would be that moral experiences do not constitute a natural kind: while there 
are many individual moral experiences, there is nothing unified about them. 
Compare: when philosophers claim that ‘there is no such thing as emotion,’ or 
that ‘there are no concepts,’ they typically turn out to mean only this: there is no 
natural homogeneity among the various things designated by ‘emotion’ or 
‘concept.’ 
 Even if there is such a thing as (a unified) moral experience, it might be 
claimed that nothing informative could be said about it. After all, it is a common 
refrain in discussions of conscious experience that the phenomenal character of 
an experience, what it is like to have it, is ineffable. It is impossible to make a 
colorblind person appreciate the phenomenal character of seeing yellow. Such 
phenomenal character can be named or labeled, but it cannot be described or 
communicated; there is no informative account of it to be had.  
 Granted that moral experience exists and is describable, it is unclear what 
significance it has within our overall moral life. In general, it is widely thought 
today that conscious experience is but the tip of the mental iceberg: most of 
what goes on in our mind, determining our behavior and capturing our 
personality and deepest commitments, goes on below the threshold of 
conscious awareness. If so, understanding the moral dimension of our mental life 
requires in the first instance illumination of those more obscured parts, through 
the patient study of relevant subpersonal cognitive processes, unconscious 
habits, and so on. Our phenomenological impressions of our moral mental life 
provide only the most superficial understanding.   
 Moral phenomenology faces a steep challenge, then. To convince us to 
pursue it, its proponents must provide satisfactory answers to the following 
three nested questions: 
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a) Is there such a thing as moral experience? b) If there is such a thing as moral experience, can it be informatively 
described? c) If there is such a thing as moral experience, and it can be informatively 
described, is it important for an understanding of moral mental life? 
I will now offer some considerations suggesting positive answers to all three 
questions.  
 
2. The Existence Question  
 
The existential challenge to moral phenomenology, recall, comes in two grades: 
the strong version claims that there are no moral experiences, the weaker one 
that moral experiences do not form a natural kind. The strong claim can be put 
to rest by citing moral mental states in which there is something it is like to be. 
Prima facie candidates include: 
1. Thinking that I ought to visit my great aunt in hospital 
2. Judging that genocide is wrong 
3. Having the intuition that it is permissible to redirect the trolley 
4. Feeling a strong desire to meet one’s professional duties in one’s new job 
5. Taking the decision to make it up to someone 
6. Seeing that what the cat-torturing kids are doing is wrong 
7. Feeling indignant about US police killing another unarmed African-
American 
8. Feeling guilty about not helping a blind person cross the street  
9. Feeling deep respect for someone 
The items on this list can be divided into four groups. Let us briefly consider 
each group’s potential of providing instances of moral experiences. 
 Items 1-3 are cognitive, or intellectual, mental states. As such, many 
might argue that they have no phenomenal character, and thus do not qualify as 
experiences in the phenomenal sense. Others, however, will defend so-called 
cognitive phenomenology (Strawson 1994 Ch1, Pitt 2004, Chudnoff 2015), and 
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so consider 1-3 genuinely phenomenal.1 Moreover, most proponents of 
cognitive phenomenology hold that there is a kind of intentional content that it 
ground. Since the contents of 1-3 are clearly moral, involving as they do moral 
concepts (ought, wrong, permissible), they would then qualify as proper objects 
of moral phenomenology. Accordingly, some have developed a 
phenomenology of moral beliefs (Horgan and Timmons 2007) or of moral 
intuitions (Bedke 2008). At the same time, many still resist the notion of 
cognitive phenomenology (Robinson 2006, Carruthers and Veillet 2011), and 
would presumably reject a phenomenology of moral cognition.  
 Second, items 4-5 are broadly ‘conative’ or ‘motivational’ states – states 
of the will whereby a subject exercises her agency. Traditionally, such states 
were thought to be best understood in terms of their distinctive functional role 
in guiding action. More recently, there has been an increasingly lively debate 
over the existence of a ‘phenomenology of agency’ that outstrips the purely 
sensory experience of bodily exertion (Bayne 2008, Mylopoulous 2015; but see 
Ginet 1986 for an early discussion). As in the case of 1-3, there is no question 
that 4-5 are moral mental states; the main bone of the contention is whether 
they are phenomenal ones. (In the background is also a question about what it 
takes for a property to be phenomenal – a question I will set aside here, relying 
entirely on the reader’s intuitive grasp of the notion.2) 
In contrast, item 6 is a perceptual state, so its status as phenomenal is not 
in question. Moreover, its content is clearly moral. Traditionally, however, 
philosophers have been skeptical of the very existence of moral perception, 
typically on the grounds that moral properties are not sensible: ‘There is no such 
thing as a sensation having as its object a quality called moral goodness’ 
(Brentano 1876: 74; see also McBrayer 2010). Presumably, the idea is that strictly 
speaking what we perceive is just the (nonmoral) supervenience base of moral 
properties; the moral properties themselves are represented only post-
perceptually. For example, although we may describe ourselves as seeing the 
kindness or generosity shown by one person to another, what is strictly 
perceptible in the exchange are certain nonmoral properties of the persons’ 
behavior, which properties “subvene” kindness or generosity. In recent 
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philosophy, however, there have been several spirited defenses of genuine 
moral perception (Harman 1977 Ch1, Cuneo 2003, McGrath 2004, Audi 2013).  
The dialectical situation with moral perception is the opposite of that with 
moral cognition and moral agency: there is no question whether perceptual 
states can be phenomenal, but there is a question whether they can be moral; 
whereas with cognitive and conative states there is no question that they can be 
moral, and the only question is whether they can be phenomenal. 
From this perspective, moral emotions – items such as 7-9 – represent the 
most promising candidate moral experiences. It is widely accepted, both 
traditionally and in contemporary philosophy of mind, that emotional states can 
be felt and have phenomenal character, but also that they are often moral. 
Moral emotions such as guilt, shame, repentance, indignation, contempt, 
outrage, resentment, respect, pride, compassion, sympathy, and gratitude are 
routinely felt and thus occur consciously.  
It remains that they may have nothing in common in virtue of which they 
are moral experiences. That is, they may not constitute a natural kind. For even if 
there was consensus on the full list of all and only moral experiences, three 
questions arise. The first: 
• Is there a phenomenal property φ, such that all moral experiences exhibit 
φ?  
Such a property would represent a phenomenal commonality of moral 
experiences: something they all share qua moral experiences. A second, 
complementary question is: 
• Is there a phenomenal property Ψ, such that only moral experiences 
exhibit Ψ? 
This would be a phenomenal peculiarity of moral experience – something 
distinctive of moral experiences that sets them apart from other mental states. A 
third question is:  
• Might φ = Ψ? 
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Might the property common to all moral experiences be also peculiar to them? 
If so, there is a single phenomenal property that all and only moral experiences 
exhibit. If an experience exhibits it, then it is a moral experience, and if it does 
not, then it is not. We may call such a property the ‘phenomenal signature’ of 
moral experience.3 
 If there is a phenomenal signature of moral experience, then moral 
experiences constitute a natural kind after all – a kind all of whose members 
share a ‘natural’ or objective similarity. But is there an argument for a 
phenomenal signature of morality? Persuasive arguments to the contrary have 
certainly been presented (Sinnott-Armstrong 2008), though capable responses 
have been offered as well (Glasgow 2013). What I want to argue here is rather 
that the question of signature is less crucial to moral phenomenology than might 
be thought. 
Consider the fundamental issue surrounding any controversial type of 
phenomenality. So far, we have treated that question as a simple existential 
question: does the relevant phenomenality exist or not? In reality, however, the 
question is subtler. It is not a simple yes/no question, but rather invites a choice 
among three possible positions: eliminativist, reductivist, and primitivist. The 
debate over cognitive phenomenology, for example, pits against each other (i) 
proponents of a sui generis cognitive phenomenality characteristic of the 
experience of thinking and (ii) opponents who claim that there is nothing it is like 
to think (Nelkin 1989); in addition, however, there is an intermediate view which 
(iii) recognizes that there is something it is like to think but attempts to account 
for it in terms of already familiar forms of sensory phenomenality (e.g., the 
experience of silent-speech imagery, perhaps augmented with attentional 
foregrounding effects). Position (i) is a form of primitivism about cognitive 
phenomenality, (iii) a kind of reductivism about it, while (ii) is straightforwardly 
eliminativist. 
Note, now, that the same three options present themselves in moral 
phenomenology – regardless of whether there is a phenomenal signature of 
moral experience. To be sure, we can formulate a similar triad about whether (i) 
the phenomenal signature exists and is irreducible to any other phenomenal 
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property, (ii) does not exist at all, or (iii) exists but reduces to some combination 
of (say) sensory, motivational, and cognitive phenomenal characters. Even if we 
opt for eliminativism here, though, we can still pose the question of elimination, 
reduction, or primitivism for individual types of putative moral experience. Thus, 
we still need to choose between the eliminativist view that there is nothing it is 
like to experience indignation, a primitivist view that indignation has a sui 
generis phenomenal character, and the reductivist view that the phenomenal 
character of indignation is nothing but a certain combination of (say) negative 
visceral sensations, conscious thoughts about an injustice, and felt motivation to 
rectify that injustice.  
 The point is that to debate the correct choice between primitivism, 
reductivism, and elminativism about indignation, or respect, or any other moral 
experience is already to engage in moral phenomenology. The existence of a 
phenomenal signature of moral experience is not a precondition for engaging in 
moral phenomenology. (Indeed, it may be rightly seen as one of the issues 
within moral phenomenology.)  
 
3. The Describability Question  
 
The stance one takes on the existence of some moral experience affects what 
approach is most suitable for its phenomenological characterization. If one is an 
eliminativist about the experience of indignation, say, then obviously, one takes 
it that there is no phenomenality in need of characterization. If one is a 
reductivist, however, the natural approach is to list all phenomenal elements the 
combination of which constitutes the phenomenal character of the experience of 
indignation. For example, if one holds that the phenomenal character of 
indignation reduces to a complex of sensory, motivational, and cognitive 
phenomenal characters, then by comprehensively listing those sensory, 
motivational, and cognitive elements, one would exhaustively characterize what 
it is like to feel indignation.  
 A more delicate question arises within the primitivist framework. Suppose 
the phenomenal character of feeling respect for persons is simple and 
draft  comments welcome 
 9	
unanalyzable; how could we hope to offer a substantive and informative 
description of it?  
The problem is not special to moral phenomenology, of course – any 
phenomenological inquiry faces it. In other areas of inquiry, the standard 
approach is to understand primitives in terms of their theoretical role within a 
dominant theory in the area. Consider an analogy from mathematics. The 
notions appearing in the theorems of Euclidean geometry are defined in terms 
of notions appearing in the system’s axioms.4 But the notions appearing in the 
axioms cannot all be defined in terms of more fundamental notions; instead, 
some must be understood in terms of their role within the axioms. Thus, Peano 
(1889) managed to define all geometric notions in terms of three fundamental 
ones (point, segment, motion), but the latter he left undefined. Still, these 
undefined notions must be understood somehow. The way mathematicians 
typically understand them is in terms of their place in the axioms. We can think 
of the axioms as describing a web of interrelations among nodes, with each 
node designated by a different primitive notion; the meaning of these nodes is 
exhausted by the interrelations specified in the axioms.   
If we are primitivist about the phenomenal character of respect, then, we 
may still envisage a comprehensive moral theory that includes fundamental 
(underived) theses about respect-experience and identify the theoretical role of 
respect-experience within it. Consider the following Kantian fundamental claims 
about respect: 
• “Respect for the [moral] law, which in its subjective aspect is called moral 
feeling, is identical with consciousness of one’s duty.” (Kant 1797/1996: 
210) 
• “Respect is properly the representation of worth that infringes upon my 
self-love.” (Kant 1785/1997: 14) 
• “… a human being regarded as a person, that is, as the subject of a 
morally practical reason, is exalted above any price [and] exacts respect 
for himself from all other rational beings in the world…” (Kant 1797/1996: 
186-7) 
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Through a sufficiently textured theoretical role of this sort (typically regimented 
through a so-called Ramsey sentence [see Lewis 1972]), we obtain a certain 
characterization of respect-experience. 
 It might be complained that although a theoretical role captures the 
relational profile of a phenomenon – its web of central connections to other 
phenomena – it provides us with no perspective on the intrinsic nature of the 
phenomenon. But this is not special to the phenomenological domain; we find it 
also in scientific theorizing about fundamental properties. In mapping out the 
laws governing the interactions of bosons and fermions, microphysics instructs 
us on the relational profile of mass, but contains no perspective on mass’ 
intrinsic nature.  
 In fact, in the phenomenological domain we have some hope of 
gathering an independent insight into intrinsic nature that in the physical 
domain we cannot really – through what we might call contrastive introspective 
revelation. Let me explain this notion in three steps.  
According to the revelation theory of color, we do not come to 
understand the nature of colors by appreciating the right philosophical (or other) 
theory (Johnston 1992). For example, we cannot grasp the nature of blue by 
digesting some philosophical theory (objectivism, dispositionalism, or other). 
Rather, we grasp the nature of blue by looking at the sky on a clear day with a 
properly functioning visual system. When we look at a paradigmatic color in the 
right conditions, and everything goes well, we are acquainted with the nature of 
that color. The basic idea in the background – profound for philosophers but 
perhaps obvious otherwise – is that the intellect (“reason”) is not the only faculty 
through which we may grasp the deep nature of a property. Sometimes the eyes 
can disclose the nature of a property better – to provide in-sight into it. And 
other faculties may do so in other cases. 
This revelation approach applies rather naturally to phenomenal 
properties. Perhaps the intellect is best positioned to disclose the nature of 
phenomenal properties that arise from combinations of more basic ones. But 
when it comes to the most basic, elemental phenomenal properties, it is rather 
direct introspective encounter that best positions us to grasp the intrinsic nature 
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of the property. We come to appreciate the nature of the property of being 
bluish, for example, when we introspect a paradigmatically bluish experience 
and everything goes well. (I use “bluish” technically to refer to the phenomenal 
property that corresponds to blue.)  
When a phenomenal primitive is introspectively salient, as tends to be the 
case with bluishness and pain, it is fairly clear how an “introspective revelation” 
theory works. But asked to directly introspect the nature of a putatively sui 
generis phenomenal character of indignation, or respect, most of us are likely to 
feel stomped: it is not clear “where to look” and “what to do.” For such 
relatively nuanced and elusive phenomenal properties, it appears crucial that we 
contemplate a variety of phenomenal contrasts that foreground the specific 
phenomenal primitive we are interested in and put it in sharper introspective 
relief. Thus, there are several types of experience that have something in 
common with, but also something crucially different from, indignation: notably 
anger and frustration, but also hurt, sorrow, and even surprise (indignation is 
typically elicited by something that in some sense we do not expect). To 
appreciate the nature of the phenomenal character of indignation, we must 
contemplate, side by side as it were, a paradigmatic experience of indignation 
and a paradigmatic experience of anger, a paradigmatic experience of 
indignation and a paradigmatic experience of frustration, a paradigmatic 
experience of indignation and a paradigmatic experience of sorrow, and so on. 
It is the moral phenomenologist’s task to provide the kinds of contrast that 
would bring out subtle phenomenal primitives from the sphere of moral 
experience (see, for an example, Horgan and Timmons forthcoming for a 
phenomenological contrast between indignation and frustration).  
It is worth distinguishing here between a dialectical use of 
phenomenological contrasts, which serves to argue for the existence of some 
phenomenal features (see Siegel 2007), and an ostensive use, which serves only 
to focus on the mind of these features (Koksvik 2011). My claim is that moral 
phenomenology can, at the very least, avail itself of phenomenological contrasts 
in their ostensive capacity. The goal is to focus the mind on any phenomenal 
primitives moral experience might involve, as a complement to their more 
relational characterization in terms of theoretical role.  
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4. The Significance Question  
 
As noted in §1, it is widely accepted today that conscious processes form the tip 
of the mental iceberg, and that most mental life – including our deepest 
dispositions and the habits most intimately tied to our behavior – takes place 
below the surface of conscious experience. Unconscious processes are also 
developmentally and evolutionarily prior to conscious processes. The latter are 
thus largely derivative phenomena, albeit ones particularly striking to us from 
the first-person perspective. Ontogenetically and phylogenetically, they are 
Johnny-come-latelys rather than foundational phenomena. If so, their study 
would seem to be of relatively secondary importance for a deep understanding 
of our moral mental life.  
 This problem is not special to moral phenomenology, of course; it affects 
all phenomenology alike. The phenomenologist’s best response to it, I think, 
was already articulated by Paul Ricœur (1950: 22) in his inquiry into the 
phenomenology of will: causal processes underlying the operation of the will 
always proceed from the bottom up, that is, from subpersonal micro-processes 
to conscious macro-processes; but understanding of their nature tends to 
proceed from the top down, illuminating those subpersonal micro-processes in 
terms of their role in underwriting the conscious macro-processes of which we 
have immediate first-person insight. A parallel point can be made about moral 
mental life. Surely the causal processes subserving the experience of indignation 
are subpersonal and unconscious, and perhaps creatures can enter unconscious 
indignation states at various stages of ontogenetic and phylogenic development 
at which they are as yet unable to experience indignation. It remains that we 
classify those unconscious states as indignation, rather than as anger or as 
frustration, only because of what it would be like to experience them if one 
underwent them consciously.  
 In the background may be two different kinds of curiosity, motivating two 
different forms of understanding. Of any phenomenon, we may ask “How did it 
come to be?,” but we may also ask “What is it?” The former question courts a 
causal answer, which tends to proceed from the bottom up, from micro to 
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macro, from part to whole, and from process onset to process product. But the 
second question is completely independent and can readily proceed from the 
top down, from macro to micro, and from whole to part. The point is that an 
answer to the “How did it come to be?” question does not automatically deliver 
an answer to the “What is it?” question. Sensitive to this distinction, Franz 
Brentano (1890) distinguished between genetic and descriptive psychology. The 
former provides causal explanation of the genesis of mental phenomena; the 
latter merely describes what the phenomena in need of explanation are. (That is, 
the former answers questions of the form “How did it come to be?,” the latter 
questions of the form “What is it?”)  
As soon as we draw this distinction, we appreciate the manner in which 
descriptive psychology is prior in the order of understanding to genetic (or 
“explanatory”) psychology: in an ideal reconstruction of science, we would 
presumably proceed by first describing the phenomena in need of explanation 
and only then offering an explanation of them.5 Without knowing what “it” is, it 
is hard to see how we might be able to explain how “it” came to be. Thus, a 
descriptive psychology – read: phenomenology – of the experience of 
indignation must logically precede a causal explanation of how such an 
experience arises from the wealth of relevant underlying unconscious processes.  
The difference between descriptive and explanatory psychology seems to 
reflect that between philosophical and scientific understanding: where science 
answers, in the first instance, causal questions of the form “How did it come to 
be?,” philosophy is interested primarily in essence and identity questions of the 
form “What (kind of thing) is it?” To that extent, we can see that moral 
phenomenology’s organizing question places it squarely within the project of 
moral philosophy.  
 Under certain assumptions, moral phenomenology may contribute to 
moral philosophy in very concrete and tangible ways. Consider the increasingly 
popular fitting attitude analysis of value, whereby we understand certain values 
in terms of the mental attitudes it is fitting, or appropriate, or in some sense 
correct, to take toward them. If we do in fact give priority to conscious 
manifestations of moral mental states in the order of understanding, then a 
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fitting attitude account of some value V would offer an understanding of V in 
terms of conscious manifestations of the attitude it is fitting to take toward items 
in V’s extension.  
 For example, one might develop a fitting guilt account of culpability or 
blameworthiness. A Ramsey sentence for guilty feelings would then capture the 
nature of blameworthiness, as that toward which it is fitting to have such 
feelings. In a similar vein, a fitting respect account of dignity would use the 
moral phenomenology of the experience of respect to illuminate the nature o of 
dignity (see Kriegel forthcoming). A fitting gratitude account of beneficence 
would invite us to study the nature of beneficence by developing a 
phenomenological theory of the experience of gratitude. And the nature of 
justice and injustice might be illuminated by an account of the phenomenal 
character of indignation.6  
 It is worth noting that while a fitting attitude analysis of moral values 
makes moral phenomenology obviously relevant to moral theory, what is 
required for such relevance is much weaker. Perhaps the most immediate 
objection to fitting attitude analyses is a variant of the Euthyphro dilemma: is 
police brutality against unarmed African-Americans unjust because it is fitting to 
feel indignant about it, or is it on the contrary fitting to feel indignant about it 
because it is unjust? There is a strong intuition that the latter is the better order 
of explanation: the injustice itself grounds the fittingness of reacting with 
indignation, not the other way around. However, even if injustice grounds 
indignation fittingness rather than the other way round, the fact that the 
indignation is fitting only if an injustice has occurred suggests that the structure 
of injustice is somehow reflected in the character of indignation. If so, we can 
use a phenomenological analysis of fitting indignation to indirectly bring out 
certain features of (in)justice. The subtler the phenomenal features our analysis 
exposes, the more elusive the corresponding features of injustice.  
 It would seem, then, that all is required for moral phenomenology of 
indignation to inform moral theory of (in)justice is the biconditional: x is unjust if 
and only if it is fitting to feel indignant about x. Biconditionals of this sort are 
very plausibly associated with many central moral values. Fitting attitude 
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analyses ground such biconditionals’ left-hand side in their right-hand side, the 
opposing accounts proceed inversely. But either way, insofar as an equivalence 
holds, phenomenological analysis of the fitting moral emotions is relevant to 
understanding moral values. Only the interpretation of this relevance will differ: 
on the value-first reading, phenomenal features of moral emotions will serve 
merely as evidence for corresponding features of moral values; on the fitting-
attitude-first reading, the connection is more constitutive than evidential. 
Nonetheless, in both cases there is a sense in which, as long as the biconditional 
holds, our axiology will be “pegged” to our moral phenomenology. 
 
Conclusion 
 
If we want to understand the moral realm, it would be an intellectual missed 
opportunity to simply ignore our first-person insight into our moral experience. I 
have belabored the feasibility and relevance of a phenomenology of moral 
experience mostly because the notion is relatively foreign to analytic moral 
philosophy. But it is worth noting that the very same notion is virtually taken for 
granted in the moral philosophy of the Brentano School and the 
phenomenological movement (see Brentano 1889, Meinong 1894, Ehrenfels 
1897, Scheler 1913, Mandelbaum 1955 inter alia). When reading this material, 
even with an analytic eye, it is striking just how rich and sophisticated the 
pursued inquiry into moral reality is. I have argued here that there are no 
foundational reasons to be skeptical of this kind of inquiry. First of all, it is clear 
that moral phenomenology has a subject matter: there clearly exist moral 
experiences, whether or not they share a phenomenal signature. Secondly, what 
it is like to undergo a moral experience is describable in a theoretically useful 
manner, and certainly directly graspable (with the aid of the right contrasts), 
even when primitive and irreducible. Finally, the highly plausible equivalence 
between moral values and fitting moral emotions, combined with a descriptive 
rather than explanatory emphasis in moral-psychological inquiry, casts moral 
phenomenology as centrally relevant to moral theory.7  
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1 Strawson, for example, argues that there is a phenomenal difference between listening to the 
news in French as someone who understands French and listening to them as someone who 
does not understand French. The difference, he claims, is in what he calls “understanding-
experience”: the experience of grasping the propositional content conveyed by the relevant 
sounds.  
 
2 In the literature, a certain movement may be discerned toward explicating phenomenality in 
terms of the characteristic intellectual puzzlement raised by the phenomenon of consciousness: 
phenomenality is that which is susceptible to an explanatory gap, or to zombie scenario, or the 
knowledge-argument reasoning, or the like (see Bayne 2009, Carruthres and Veillet 2011, 
Horgan 2011, Kriegel 2015 Ch1). 
  
3 We can also speak of an “approximate phenomenal signature” or a “phenomenal near-
signature” in case there is a phenomenal property that most moral experiences exhibit and/or 
almost all of them do.  
 
4 I use the term “notion” as conveniently ambiguous between terms and concepts (somewhat as 
“statement” is often used as conveniently ambiguous between sentence and proposition).  
 
5 It is noteworthy, in this context, that particle physicists, too, distinguish between the task of 
recording the way a particle behaves under various experimental conditions and the task of 
offering an explanatory model of this behavior; interestingly, physicists refer to the former 
endeavor as “phenomenology.” Thus, the most recent particle to be discovered, the Higgs 
boson, was discovered in 2012. But a “phenomenological” characterization of the phenomena 
warranting positing it predated the discovery significantly (see, e.g., Ellis et al. 1976). The point 
is that distinguishing description from explanation cannot be cast as a naïve notion of the 
humanities; it is essential to the conduct of inquiry in the most rigorous sectors of basic science.  
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6 For central elements of the Ramsey sentence for indignation experience, see Horgan and 
Timmons forthcoming. 
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